We discuss linear production games or market games with a continuum of players which are represented as minima of nitely many nonatomic measures. Within this contex we consider vNM-Stable Sets according to von Neumann and Morgenstern. We c l a s s i f y o r c haracterize all solutions of this type which are convex polyhedra, i.e., which are the convex hull of nitely many imputations. Speci cally, i n e a c h convex polyhedral vNM-Stable Set and not only in the symmetric ones, the di erent types of traders must organize themselves into cartels. The vNM-Stable Set is then the convex hull of the utility distributions of the cartels. Using the results from the continuum, we obtain a similar characterization also for nite glove market games .
Introduction
Within this paper we want to characterize the von Neumann and Morgenstern vNM stable sets as applied to linear production games. Such games represent production in xed proportions, where the long side of the supply of the production factors is strictly greater than the short side. Within this context, most economic and game theoretical solution concepts yield zero pro t to the long side, because of excess of supply. By contrast, revitalizing the concept of both internal and external stability o f vNM solutions, we obtain that each side will form a cartel see Hart HART74 and the stable set will be the convex hull of the utility distributions of both cartels. A vNM-Stable Set is in the words of von Neumann and Morgenstern vNM44 seen as a standard of behavior. In particular each such standard of economic behavior will treat both sides equally, and in particular the long side of the market will end up with some positive amount of utility. The games we consider are both nonatomic and nite totally balanced ones cf. Shapley-Shubik SHSH69 represented as minima of nitely many measures. In the nite context this class is equivalent to either the class of market games or the class of linear production games. Formally, these games are represented by means of nitely many measures EHMS96 , hence within this paper we will concentrate on the general nonnormalized, nonexact case describing economic situations where the short side of the market is di erent from the long side. We restrict ourselves to the orthogonal case all measures involved have m utually disjoint carriers. In EHMS96 it was shown that the core is the unique vNM-Stable Set provided the game is exact. In our case, where the game is in general not exact, this cannot occur, by c o n trast it turns out that we h a ve to provide a complete description of all vNM-Stable Sets. Purely nite glove markets as well as our non-atomic games with orthogonal measures describe a pure exchange economy with di erent types of traders, each type commanding a corner of the market consisting of a certain variety of gloves. The core as well as the Walrasian equilibria and other solution concepts for such situations as described by Billera and Raanan BILRA81 assign zero utility to the long side of the market. We emphasize that our results do much better: Markets organized according to convex polyhedral vNM-Stable Sets treat all types symmetrically, that is, rst of all each type decides how to distribute the amount of total production among its memberswith some boundover the density of the distribution, and secondly, a standard of behavior is introduced by implementing the convex hull of r such distributions. The main result of this paper is hence the characterization of all convex polyhedral vNM-Stable Sets of nonexact totally balanced games or, equivalently, the complete description of a solution concept not discriminating the long side of a large exchange economy unduly. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is introduced. Section 3 is devoted to the description of standard solutions. In Section 4 we prove the Main Characterization Theorem of convex polyhedral vNMStable Sets. In order to achieve this result, some preparatory lemmata and theorems are obtained: we prove The Density Lemma and the Inheritance Lemma as well as the Support Theorem and the Orthogonality Theorem. Section 5 presents the Embedding Theorem which bridges the gap between nite glove games and our nonatomic linear production games. Finally, in Section 6 w e o er the complete characterization for the nite case. We would like to express our thanks to Sergiu Hart. He discussed the topic frequently with us and his comments and suggestions were most in uential in the process of preparing this paper. 1 Our rst observation is true for a general situation of this type, however, later on we shall assume that the measures are in addition orthogonal. Presently we introduce a certain type of vNM-stable set which, as it turns out fully describes the relevant class of convex vNM-Stable Sets.
As a prerequisit we rst turn to external stability of the solution concept we have in mind. As both, and are imputations, this result clearly contradicts the fact that S 0 S 0 is required in view of dom S ; hence there can beno internal domination in S; qed.
? One of our main goals within this paper is to show that the class of standard solutions is large, actually it describes all convex compact vNM-Stable Sets with nitely many extreme points. The topic will bedealt with within the next section.
Characterizing Convex Stable Sets
Within this section we start to develop the converse direction or the 'characterization' of vNM-Stable Sets. That is we want to show that all convex compact polyhedral solutions of a game v =^ 1 ; ; r are elements of the standard class as de ned in De nition 3.3 of Section 3. To this end, some prerequisits are necessary, most of which, however, may beconsidered to beofinterest of their own. The rst lemma corroborates the idea that solutions to a game described by 1 are contain only measures that are absolutely continous w.r.t to the reference measure. More than that, we have the following result. and is a probability. This probability strictly exceeds on C 1c C if the carriers are not disjoint, hence it cannot be dominated by a n y element o f S: Extending this argument, it is clear that C has to be in the carrier of 2 and that r necessarily h a s t o b e t wo. Thus we see, that in this case S is a standard solution.
For the subsequent discussion we may, therefore, always assume that a convex solution has at least three extremepoints, one of which i s 1 :
In order to proceed with the next Theorem, some auxiliary lemma is necessary. The lemma shows that domination between two imputations with respect to some measurable set S is always inherited by an arbitrarily small subset of S: We are now in the position to do a major step towards our main goal: we c a n show that the extreme points in S are essentially orthogonal. More precisely, we have Proof: This follows now easily from the Orthogonality Theorem 4.8. Indeed, any t wo of the extreme points of S on any carrier C will either coincide or one of them will vanish. Non of them will have total mass strictly between
Finite Solutions versus Large Solutions
Within this section we discuss the 'injection' or 'embedding'of a nite game into the continuum. This way w e obtain a game with a continuum of players within which full intervals corresponding to the weight of nite players have the same power as those players in the nite game. Naturally the question arises as to whether vNM-Stable Sets are compatible with the embedding procedure and our result is a rmative. At rst sight, this result may draw limited enthusiasm. For, while it is nice that all vNM-Stable Sets of nite games obeying a natural condition induce vNM-Stable Sets of continuous games it also tells us clearly that there is little hope for 'classifying' all continuous vNM-Stable Sets as this seems to be out of the question in the nite case -for the time being. On second thought there is also good news: it turns out that our description of all convex polyhedral vNM-Stable Sets surprisingly also induces a description of all convex polyhedral vNM-Stable Sets for nite games. Clearly, this has nice consequences for it means that we can o er a class of solution concepts for nite general glove games -apart from the fact that no classi cation of this type so far has beenattempted in the nite context. We will come back to these nice conclusions in a subsequent section. At present we start out to present the 'embedding procedure'. qed.
Remark 5.5. Note that condition 7 is a close relative of the general density property as discussed in Remark 4.10.
Finite Games versus Large Games
Within this section we are going to combine the results of the previous sections in order to draw some conclusions regarding the theory of vNM-stable sets for nite games. Surprisingly, the characterization of all convex stable sets as obtained within sections 3 and 4 allows also to characterize stable sets of nite games in view of the embedding theorem provided in section 5 and its converse. Proof: Consider the embedding S of S. By Theorem 3.2 we know that S is a vNM-stable Set for the embedding v of v:Therefore, by Theorem 5.4 we conclude that S is a vNM-Stable Set for v:
Now to the converse direction: suppose S is a polyhedral vNM-Stable Set for v:By the embedding Theorem 5.3 is it clear that S is a polyhedral vNMStable Set for v. Note that the conditions 6 and 7 are automatically satis ed by the internal stability of S and by the fact that we have uniform distribution at hand. Apply now the Main Theorem of Characterization 4.9 to obtain the result that S is the convex hull of r orthogonal probabilities each of which is majorized by the Lebesgue measure restricted to the appropriate C : Turning back to S; we obtain the desired result.
qed. Proof: The example is constructed in the spirit of the class given by Shapley 1 can be checked. In the rst case, if all x i i 2 f 3; 4; 5; 6g are equal, replace x p by x p," for su ciently small " 0 and repeat the argument mutatis mutandis. Similarly, the case that x 1 x p 1 is dealt with. So it remains to consider the case that x j x p j j 2 f1; 2g: But by the de nition of p; this means x j = x p j j 2 f 1; 2g: Since x 6 = x p there is i 2 f 3; 4; 5; 6g such that x i x p i . Now replace x p by x p+ for su ciently small 0 and repeat the previous argument mutatis mutandis. Now to the continuous case. The fact that the embedding S is a vNMStable Set follows from Theorem 5.4 because we are dealing with uniform distribution.
qed. 
